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SUBTLE BUT PERVASIVE: DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST MOTHERS & PREGNANT WOMEN IN
THE WORKPLACE
Alison A. Reuter *
INTRODUCTION
Laurie Anne Freeman, a world-renowned expert on information
technology and Japanese politics and a professor in the Political Science
Department at the University of California, Santa Barbara, received
extremely positive reviews from her department until she had two
daughters and took leaves to be with them. 1 The reviews she received after
returning from her leaves were increasingly critical of her research and
productivity. 2 Despite family-friendly university policies, including rules
that prohibited consideration of leave time when evaluating productivity,
the department repeatedly evaluated her earlier than scheduled and
compared her unfavorably with professors who had not taken leaves.3
When Freeman came up for tenure, she had an impressive list of
accomplishments including two prestigious fellowships, one book
published and one under contract, and invitations to present her work at
leading institutions including Harvard and Stanford. 4 Overwhelmingly
negative assessments from her department, however, culminated in a
unanimous recommendation to deny tenure.5 But that was not the end of
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1. See Charlotte Fishman, “Teetering on the Family-friendly Edge”: Discrimination
Against
Mothers
in
Academia,
COMMON
DREAMS,
Sept.
25,
2005,
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0925-21.htm; Scott Jaschik, Faux FamilyHIGHER
E D,
Sept.
15,
2005,
friendly?,
INSIDE
http://insidehighered.com/news/2005/09/15/ucsb.
2. See Fishman, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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the road for Freeman. 6
The Chancellor sent Freeman’s case back to the Political Science
Department for a new tenure review. 7 Again, the department attacked her
scholarly work. 8 This time, however, the Chancellor could not overlook
the overwhelmingly positive assessment of experts in her field and her
outstanding résumé. 9 The Chancellor granted her tenure.10 Freeman was
not satisfied; she filed a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), alleging that her
decisions to have children and to use the university’s family-friendly policy
were the real reasons for her tenure denial.11 On September 6, 2005,
Freeman was granted a rare EEOC cause determination.12 Charlotte
Fishman, Freeman’s lawyer, said that she thought the cause determination
was important because it drew attention to the sex-plus discrimination that
women face in academia. 13 Sex-plus discrimination, however, is not
limited to academia. Freeman’s story highlights the discrimination that
women face in the workplace, even at so-called family-friendly institutions.
Despite legislation designed to promote equality for women and mothers
in the workplace, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the “PDA”), and the Family and
Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”), discrimination persists.
Rolereinforcing stereotypes 14 and the male-centric job model 15 continue to
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See Jaschik, supra note 1. Sex-plus claims are premised upon discrimination
“against subclasses of women, distinguished not simply by gender but by an additional
characteristic such as weight or marital or parental status.” Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and
the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2495 (1994).
14. Role-reinforcing stereotypes of women include women as caregivers, nurturers, and
domestics. See Mary Romero, Bursting the Foundational Myths of Reproductive Labor
Under Capitalism: A Call for Brave New Families or Brave New Villages?, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 177, 185 (2000) (“Cultural beliefs are reinforced by structuring
women’s roles accordingly in institutions other than the family. Everyday practices in
school, church, government, and the economy reinforce values and beliefs about women’s
inherent ability to nurture and care. This includes continued support for the gendered
division of labor.”).
15. The workplace is structured around an “ideal worker” who has no childcare
responsibilities, is able to work a minimum of forty hours per week year round, and can
work overtime with little or no notice. See Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict:
Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305,
310 (2004). The current workplace model, the male-centric job model, is centered on an
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constrain women. The existing statutes are in large part narrowly applied
by the courts and, as written, are insufficient to curtail the problem. The
passage of the PDA acknowledged that pregnancy discrimination is a
problem and began to roll back the paternalistic treatment of pregnant
women, 16 but the PDA has not significantly alleviated the problem of
pregnancy discrimination. It has been construed narrowly so that in many
jurisdictions it covers only discrimination arising from pregnancy itself, as
distinct from its side effects. 17 And the PDA does not grapple with many
fundamental issues necessary to secure equality for women in the
workplace and at home, such as how to structure the provision of childcare
and breast-feeding. Women can attempt to pursue these claims as sex-plus
claims under Title VII, but that route has proven to be generally
Thus, many women are left unprotected from
unsuccessful. 18
discrimination in the workplace based on their status as mothers, childcare
providers, and producers of breast milk.
According to one possible indicator, the number of charges filed with the
EEOC, pregnancy discrimination is on the rise. 19 With more than sixty-

outdated version of the nuclear family. See id.
16. Scott Caplan-Cotenoff has noted the PDA’s effects, writing that
[e]nactment of the PDA undermines the employer’s assumption that women will
leave the workforce upon becoming pregnant. . . . By placing pregnancy-related
disability on the same footing as all other workplace disabilities, the PDA helps to
equalize the status of female and male workers. Therefore, in theory, the PDA
positively affects society, as it lends credence to the view that women, like men,
may have both a career and a family if they so desire.
Scott A. Caplan-Cotenoff, Note and Comment, Parental Leave: The Need for a National
Policy to Foster Sexual Equality, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 71, 79-80 (1987).
17. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999).
18. See, e.g., Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 213-14 (D. Conn. 2004)
(denying plaintiff’s sex-plus claim); Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying breast-feeding plaintiff’s sex-plus claim because plaintiff was not
similarly situated to male employees as required for a prima facie case of sex-plus
discrimination).
19. See U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM’N, PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
CHARGES:
EEOC
&
FEPAS
COMBINED:
FY
1992
–
FY
2004,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
PREGNANCY STATS]; see also Stephanie Armour, Pregnant Workers Report Growing
Feb.
16,
2005,
at
1B,
available
at
Discrimination,
USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-02-16-pregnancy-bias-usat_x.htm#.
In FY2002, the EEOC and state FEPAs received 4,714 charges alleging
pregnancy discrimination—39% more than the 3,385 charges filed in 1992. In the
same year, the EEOC resolved 4,778 pregnancy discrimination charges and
recovered $10 million in monetary awards for charging parties and other
aggrieved individuals (not including monetary benefits obtained through
litigation). Many claimants also filed lawsuits against their employers in court,
but . . . such lawsuits are extremely difficult for employees to win.
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eight million women in the workforce, including 72.9 percent of women
with children under age eighteen, 20 in recent years the EEOC has seen a
thirty-five percent increase in the number of pregnancy discrimination
charges filed when compared with the number of charges filed in 1992,21
even though the United States has seen a nine percent reduction in its birth
rate. 22 One reason for the rise in charges is that more women are in the
workforce today than when the PDA was passed. In 2003, women
comprised forty-seven percent of the total labor force, with a labor force
participation rate of 59.5 percent (meaning that 59.5 percent of women at
least sixteen years old were working or seeking employment). 23 Nearly
three-quarters of mothers are in the workforce, including most women with
very young children. 24 A second factor is that today more women work
during their pregnancies and work further into their pregnancies.25 In the
decade before the PDA was passed, more than half of employed women
quit their jobs when they learned they were pregnant.26 But by the early
1990s the number of women who quit their jobs in anticipation of
childbirth dropped to 26.9 percent.27 Another factor that may have
influenced the rise in charges is that a sluggish economy has pushed
employers to lay off workers and stress productivity. 28 Accompanying the
rise in pregnancy discrimination cases is a growing number of cases
challenging discrimination against mothers and fathers based on their
childcare responsibilities.29 Such challenges are generally raised under
Title VII. 30
This Comment examines discrimination against mothers in the
workplace, including discrimination against women on the basis of

NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, WOMEN AT WORK: LOOKING BEHIND THE NUMBERS:
40 YEARS AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 13 (2004) (citations omitted), available
at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/portals/p3/library/CivilRightsAffAction/WomenAtWork
CRA40thAnnReport.pdf [hereinafter WOMEN AT WORK].
20. WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 12.
21. This statistic was derived by taking the difference between the average of the
number of charges from 2002 to 2005 (4581) and the number of charges in 1992 (3385) and
dividing it by the number of charges in 1992. PREGNANCY STATS, supra note 19.
22. WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 12.
23. See id. at 2.
24. See id. at 3.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Armour, supra note 19, at 1B.
29. See WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 13.
30. See id.
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pregnancy, childcare, and breast-feeding, and proposes that new legislation
is necessary in order to create equal opportunities for men and women, at
work and at home. This new legislation, the Parental Discrimination Act,
would specifically try to remedy the embedded assumptions and biases that
lie beneath discrimination against pregnant women and mothers. Until the
embedded assumptions and biases that form the basis for the current workfamily structure are eradicated, women and men will not be able to enjoy
equal opportunities both at work and at home. Part I of this Comment lays
out the history of discrimination against pregnant women and mothers at
work, and examines the legislation designed to promote equality between
men and women in the workplace, focusing on Title VII (sex-plus cases
and the PDA). It then looks at Title VII decisions to discern the state of the
law and note the areas where pregnant women and mothers are not
protected from discrimination. Part II contrasts the current status of the law
with the proposals of various legal theorists and offers a critique of the
effects of the current statutory framework. Part III suggests an accounting
of the holes in the statutory framework and proposes new legislation to
stiffen the protections given to pregnant women and mothers in the
workplace.
I. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR PREGNANT WOMEN AND MOTHERS
A. A Brief History of Mothers & Pregnant Women in the Workplace
Throughout history women have enjoyed fewer legal rights and career
opportunities than men; historically a woman’s chief profession was to be a
wife and mother. 31 In Bradwell v. Illinois 32 in 1873 and Muller v.
Oregon 33 in 1908, the Supreme Court upheld state laws limiting the types
of jobs women could perform and the number of hours they could work in
part because there was a governmental interest in promoting women’s
maternal functions and because those maternal functions were incompatible
with the workplace. 34 And even with time, the idea that a woman (and in
particular a pregnant woman) belonged at home with her children did not
fade away. In the 1950s some states created disability insurance programs
to provide partial wage replacement to temporarily disabled workers, but
31. See
Women’s
Int’l
Ctr.,
Women’s
History
in
America,
http://www.wic.org/misc/history.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
32. 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
33. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limitations on a woman’s workday based on the
dependent nature of women and the need for healthy women to serve as mothers).
34. See Saranna Thornton, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, SLOAN WORK AND FAMILY
RESEARCH NETWORK, Jan. 2005, http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/encyclopedia_entry.php?id=272.
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these programs either excluded pregnancy or provided only restricted
pregnancy benefits. 35 Before Congress passed the PDA, it was not
uncommon for pregnant employees to be fired, demoted, forced to take an
unpaid leave, or denied leave entirely. 36
Today, however, nearly thirty years after the PDA was passed,
pregnancy discrimination persists and discrimination against parents due to
their childcare responsibilities is on the rise, as evidenced by the EEOC
statistics cited in the Introduction.37 Underneath this continued pattern of
discrimination lie enduring stereotypes about pregnant women and
mothers. 38 Research shows that women who become pregnant are viewed
as less competent in the workplace. 39 Women who adopt more flexible
schedules are also viewed as less competent. 40 And new “momism”
dictates that in order to succeed at motherhood a mother must dedicate her
entire life to taking care of her children, placing the bar for mothers so high
that it cannot be reached.41 These stereotypes and others can be seen in
many pregnancy discrimination cases and even in the legislation designed
to halt pregnancy discrimination. They will be explored more fully in Part
II of this Comment.
B. The Emergence of Legislative Protections for Working Women:
Title VII, the PDA, & the FMLA42
In 1964 Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, providing
protections against employment discrimination based on race, color,

35. See Caplan-Cotenoff, supra note 16, at 74.
36. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 25
Years
Later:
Pregnancy
Discrimination
Persists,
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/portals/p3/library/WorkplaceDiscrimination/Pregnancy2
5thAnnivFacts.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006); Thornton, supra note 34.
37. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
38. See Joan C. Williams, Women’s Work is Never Done: Employment, Family, and
Activism: Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
365, 383-84 (2004).
39. See id. at 388 (referring to Jane Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in
Performance Appraisals, 14 J. ORG. BEHAV. 649, 650-55 (1993)); see also infra notes 30812, 320 and accompanying text.
40. See Williams, supra note 38, at 388.
41. See Karen S. Peterson, Motherhood, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2004, at 6D, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-02-24-motherhood-usat_x.htm; infra notes
261-67 and accompanying text.
42. This paper focuses on Title VII claims, however, discrimination claims can also be
brought as Equal Protection Clause claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See, e.g., Back
v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004).

REUTER_CHRISTENSEN

20xx]

2/3/2011 10:20 PM

DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE

107

national origin, religion, and sex.43 The inclusion of sex discrimination in
the Act was a last minute decision and due in large part to a successful fight
by women’s rights advocates.44 Following the Act’s passage, women’s
rights advocates worked to ensure vigorous enforcement of it by the
EEOC. 45 Women began to pursue Title VII claims, and their successes and
disappointments paved the way for the development of sex discrimination
jurisprudence to date. 46
The two aspects of Title VII most relevant to an examination of
discrimination claims based on pregnancy, motherhood, and childcare are
sex-plus cases and cases filed under the PDA. Sex-plus claims are
premised upon discrimination “against subclasses of women, distinguished
not simply by gender but by an additional characteristic such as weight or
marital or parental status.” 47 In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the
Supreme Court recognized the viability of sex-plus claims. 48 The Court
reversed and remanded the Fifth Circuit’s grant of summary judgment for
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964).
The two types of gender discrimination claims are disparate treatment and disparate
impact. See Maureen E. Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating Male: Biology, Gender, and
Discrimination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 877 (2005). This Note deals mainly with
disparate treatment claims. “[D]isparate treatment claims allege different treatment
‘because of’ or ‘based on’ gender, without an overt gender-based policy. Employers must
have intentionally disfavored women (or pregnant women).” See id. Disparate treatment
claims can be proven by direct evidence or indirectly using the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting analysis. See id. at 877.
Because direct evidence is so rare, the McDonnell Douglas framework for indirect
proof is most often used. To create a prima facie case,
[t]he plaintiff must show (1) that she belongs to the protected class (e.g., female or
pregnant); (2) that she performed her duties satisfactorily; (3) that she suffered an
adverse employment action; and finally, (4) (in most circuits) that similarly
situated employees not in the protected class (e.g., non-pregnant women) received
better treatment. If successful, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action. The ultimate burden of
persuasion remains with the plaintiff. A defendant can escape liability if it can
show a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the business.
Id. at 877-78.
In disparate impact claims, there is no intent requirement, but the plaintiff must
show that a facially neutral policy caused disproportionate harm to a particular class of
employees. See id. The burden of persuasion is also on the plaintiff to show that the
application of the policy cannot be justified by business necessity. See id.
44. See WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 1.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Abrams, supra note 13, at 2495. To succeed on a sex-plus claim, the plaintiff must
compare her treatment to a corresponding subclass of men with the same characteristic.
Eldredge, supra note 43, at 879.
48. See 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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the employer where the plaintiff alleged discrimination based on an
employer’s rule prohibiting mothers of pre-school aged children from
holding certain positions. 49 Treating mothers with young children
differently than fathers with young children, without the presence of a bona
fide occupational qualification, constituted sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII. 50
Initially Title VII did not include the PDA. Congress enacted the PDA
primarily in response to a series of Supreme Court rulings: Geduldig v.
Aiello, 51 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 52 and Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty. 53 54 In Geduldig, an Equal Protection case, the Court held that
California’s decision not to insure the risk of disability from normal
pregnancy did not constitute invidious discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. 55 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held
[t]he California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit
eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities. While
it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification. 56

Justice Rehnquist quoted heavily from Geduldig when writing his majority
opinion in Gilbert. 57
In Gilbert, the Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities from General Electric’s disability plan did not constitute sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII. 58 Justices Brennan and Stevens
wrote spirited dissents, rejecting the majority’s contention that pregnancy
49. See id. at 543-44.
50. See id.
51. 417 U.S. 484 (1975).
52. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
53. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
54. See Caplan-Cotenoff, supra note 16, at 75-78; Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in
the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 485 n.101 (2001). Prior
to these three cases, the lower courts had debated whether or not pregnancy discrimination
was constitutional. See Thornton, supra note 34. For example, in 1972 the Sixth Circuit
held that forcing a teacher to take a mandatory maternity leave beginning during her second
trimester of pregnancy was unconstitutional sex discrimination. LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd.
of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972). But, just a year later, the Fourth Circuit held that
the school board’s mandate that pregnant teachers begin maternity leave during the second
trimester was not unconstitutional sex discrimination. See Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch.
Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973).
55. 417 U.S. at 494 (1974).
56. Id. at 496 n.20.
57. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-36.
58. Id. at 145-46
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discrimination is not discrimination based on sex. Justice Brennan
identified the following as the objective of Title VII: “to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices
and devices which have fostered [sexually] stratified job environments to
the disadvantage of [women].” 59 Justice Stevens noted that
[i]t is not accurate to describe the program as dividing “potential
recipients into two groups–pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”
Insurance programs, company policies, and employment contracts all deal
with future risks rather than historic facts. The classification is between
persons who face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not.” 60 Justices
Brennan and Stevens’s dissents were later given credence when Congress
enacted the PDA. In fact, many courts and legal thinkers consider the
PDA a direct response to Gilbert. 61

In Satty a woman who was required to take a leave of absence from her
job during her pregnancy also lost all accumulated job seniority and did not
receive pay while on leave.62 The Court held that the employer’s seniority
policy violated Title VII, but remanded as to the pay policy to determine
whether the plaintiff had adequately preserved the right to proceed on a
theory that the sick pay policy was a pretext for discrimination.63 In Satty,
the Court relied heavily on their decision in Gilbert. 64 In this case, Justices
Powell and Stevens wrote concurrences and Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined Justice Powell’s concurrence. 65 At the close of his concurrence
Justice Stevens expressed his distaste for Gilbert and for the majority’s
reasoning. 66 He wrote that because his preference for deciding the case on
“a simpler rationale. . . . is foreclosed by Gilbert, I concur in the Court’s
judgment on the understanding that as the law now stands, although some
discrimination against pregnancy—as compared with other physical
disabilities—is permissible, discrimination against pregnant or formerly
pregnant employees is not.” 67 Justice Stevens would not have to wait long
59. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
60. Id. at 161 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676
(1983) (holding that an employer’s health plan limiting pregnancy coverage for employees’
spouses, but not for female employees, constituted discrimination against male employees);
Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 819, 824 (2001).
62. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 137 (1977).
63. See id. at 145-46
64. See id. at 142-46.
65. See id. at 146.
66. See id. at 157 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. Id.
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for a change in the law.
In 1978, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended to
include the PDA. The PDA amends section 701, Definitions, by adding
subsection (k), which provides:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this subchapter
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall not require
an employer to pay for health benefits for abortion, except where the life
of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or
except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion:
Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing
abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to
abortion. 68

The PDA only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees.69
When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, Congress “unambiguously
expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court
in the Gilbert decision.” 70 The House Report stated that the dissenters in
Gilbert had correctly interpreted Title VII, 71 and the Senate Report quoted
the dissenting opinions while noting that they correctly expressed “the
principle and meaning of Title VII.” 72 But the Congressional intent behind
the PDA went beyond just reversing the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gilbert. 73 In drafting the PDA, Congress intended to enforce the goal of
prohibiting sex discrimination by re-defining sex discrimination to
specifically include pregnancy discrimination. 74 A 2001 Washington
federal district court decision explained:
[I]n enacting the PDA, Congress embraced the dissent’s broader
interpretation of Title VII which not only recognized that there are sex-

68. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-k (1981).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
70. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983).
71. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 474950; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., REPORT ON
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 148 (Comm.
Print 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749-50 [hereinafter LEG. HIST.] ).
72. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 2-3 (1977); LEG. HIST., supra note 71, at 39-40).
73. See Magid, supra note 61, at 824-25.
74. See id.
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based differences between men and women employees, but also required
employers to provide women-only benefits or otherwise incur additional
expenses on behalf of women in order to treat the sexes the same. 75

This broad reading of the PDA, however, is not the norm. 76 In addition,
the text of the PDA does not include childcare and though some argue that
it could be construed to include breast-feeding, courts have unanimously
held that it does not. 77
In a 2001 article, Julie Manning Magid argued that courts have applied
the PDA too narrowly. Magid discussed the structure of the PDA—two
clauses joined by “and”; each clause with its own grammatically
independent meaning. 78
Importantly, both clauses define the PDA as referring to pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions. Joining these definitional
provisions with the conjunction “or” specifically highlights that the
amendment is concerned not only with aspects of pregnancy related to
medical manifestations, but pregnancy in all of its manifestations. In
addition, only the more specific second clause involving disability
compares the pregnant person to those similarly affected. 79

Magid noted that although many courts have focused exclusively on the
second clause of the PDA, 80 the first clause shows “the gist of
congressional intention in enacting the PDA and the second clause was
merely illustrative and meant to overrule the holding in Gilbert by
prescribing the specific remedy for the disabilities program in that case.”81
The Supreme Court has supported Magid’s reading of the PDA and held
that the first clause of the PDA is not limited by the language in the second
clause. 82 Thus, many courts’ narrow interpretations are questionable.
The FMLA, enacted fifteen years after the PDA, was the first federal
statute to address parental leave. 83 Congress failed to pass more stringent
family leave acts, but passed this watered down version, and it was hailed
as a great success for women and families.84 The FMLA provides that

75. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
76. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999).
77. See infra notes 100-31, 175-218 and accompanying text.
78. See Magid, supra note 61, at 825.
79. Id. at 824.
80. See id. at 825-26.
81. Id. at 835.
82. See California Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987);
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n.14 (1983).
83. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2619, 2651-2654 (2006).
84. See Joanna Grossman, Why the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 Should be
Amended: The Act’s Tenth Anniversary Should Prompt a Rethinking, Oct. 7, 2003,
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employers with more than fifty employees in a seventy-five mile radius
must offer eligible employees up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave after
childbirth or adoption, to care for an ill child, spouse or parent, or in the
case of the employee’s own serious illness. 85 Covered employers must
continue the employee’s health coverage during the leave, 86 and, upon the
employee’s return to work, must reinstate the employee to the same or
similar position. 87 Employers may exempt their key employees from
coverage—their highest-paid ten percent whose leave would cause the
company harm 88—and any employee who has not worked at least 1,250
hours for that employer in the previous twelve months. 89 The FMLA
emphasizes the importance of both parents’ involvement in early
childrearing and the importance of accommodations and thus attempts to
keep parents from having to choose between job security and
childrearing. 90
But the FMLA has not achieved all of the goals outlined in its
preamble. 91 For example, the FMLA does not mandate paid family leave,
and because taking twelve weeks of unpaid leave may not be an
economically feasible option, many parents are unable to stay home and
“participate in early childrearing.”92 In addition, the FMLA did not change
the status quo for many employees. “[T]he FMLA was primarily a
symbolic act, which afforded no significant assistance to working women,
or men, and has perhaps retarded progress on the family leave front more
than it has plausibly helped . . . . [T]he FMLA essentially replicated what
the market was already providing—unpaid leave for large employers.”93
Furthermore, the FMLA does not cover a vast percentage of American
employees. 94

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20031007.html.
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
86. Id. § 2614(c)(1).
87. Id. § 2614(a).
88. Id. § 2614(b).
89. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii).
90. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 324.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 325.
93. Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL.
L. REV. 395, 396 (1999). Also, at the time the FMLA was enacted, thirty-four states, Puerto
Rico, and Washington, D.C., had already passed leave legislation. Id. at 407. And, “the fact
that the FMLA largely replicates what employers were already providing raises the question
why the legislation was seen as so important and why its advocates were willing to settle for
such a weak form of parental leave.” Id. at 410.
94. See id. at 406; see also Kaminer, supra note 15, at 307 n.10 (noting that only
approximately one-half of the American workforce is eligible for leave under the FMLA).
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Ten years after the FMLA was passed, though most employers have
implemented it, it has had little effect on the stereotypes and biases that
women face in the workplace. 95 Because women are still more likely than
men to take childcare leave, employers continue to see women as more
costly and less desirable. 96 The legislative history of the FMLA indicates it
was passed to complement existing laws (such as Title VII and the PDA)
and to accommodate mothers.97 And while it has forced some employers
to accommodate female employees, the FMLA has not changed the
stereotypes those employees face when they become pregnant or take leave
to stay home with a sick child.98 In fact, some scholars argue that the
FMLA is filled with underlying stereotypes.99
Because this Comment focuses on discrimination, particularly the subtle
forms of discrimination—embedded assumptions, stereotypes, and
biases—faced by working pregnant women and mothers, the cases
discussed center on Title VII, sex-plus cases, and the PDA. There will be a
more extensive discussion of the FMLA in Part II.
C. The Cases
1. Breast-Feeding
Discrimination because of breast-feeding affects the least number of
women of the three bases for discrimination discussed in this Comment,
but it is an important issue to new mothers who want to return to work and
provide the health and psychological benefits of breast-feeding to their
Lactation is rarely discussed in Puritanical American
children. 100
society. 101 California and Illinois are among the handful of states that

95. See Magid, supra note 61, at 834; Selmi, supra note 93, at 410. But, by other
standards the FMLA has been a success. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, FMLA
Regulations Threatened, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Default.aspx?tabid=140 (last
visited Oct. 10, 2006). The FMLA has “transformed the workplace and strengthened the
American family by helping millions of Americans balance work and family
responsibilities.” Id.
96. See Grossman, supra note 84.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., Lindsay R.B. Dickerson, “Your Wife Should Handle It”: The Implicit
Messages of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 441 (2005)
(reviewing SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE
IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN (2004)).
100. See Christine G. Cooper, The Search for Sex Equality: A Perspective From The
Podium on Law and Cultural Change, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 450 (2005).
101. See id.
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provide some protection to lactating working women. 102 Some private
companies accommodate breast-feeding women on their own; about
twenty-one percent of companies surveyed in a 2004 study said they
provided lactation programs or rooms where lactating mothers could pump
breast milk. 103 But no federal statute provides explicit protection to these
women. 104
In a 2001 article, Shana M. Christrup described the inadequate
protection given to breast-feeding women in the workplace by the current
statutes (the PDA, Title VII, the ADA, and the FMLA) and suggested a
policy requiring employers to accommodate breast-pumping. 105 To
promote equality in the workplace, such that men and women are paid the
same for doing the same job, policies must “allow women to enter the
separate sphere of continuous employment while men enter the separate
sphere of child rearing.” 106 Breast-pumping policies can be a tool used to
promote equality between the sexes at home and at work, if they encourage
both women and men to participate in the public and private sphere.107
Christrup noted that a breast-pumping accommodation policy would be
relatively simple to implement and, as long as it is accompanied by the
FMLA, would give women more options—women would be more free to
decide when to return to work and whether or not to breast-feed. 108 In
addition to the lack of policies tailored to address the concerns of breastfeeding women, courts uniformly have held that Title VII does not cover
breast-feeding. 109
For example, in Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., the court denied relief to a
plaintiff who sought additional time off from work under Title VII in order

102. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1030 (West 2001) (requiring employers to provide a
reasonable amount of break time to accommodate an employee’s desire to pump breast
milk); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 260/10 (2001) (requiring employers to provide reasonable
unpaid break time each day for employees to pump breast milk).
103. See Shera Dalin, Babes in Workland, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2005, at
E01.
104. See Cooper, supra note 100, at 450-52.
105. See Christrup, supra note 54, at 494.
106. Id. at 497.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 484; see, e.g., Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir.
2004) (surveying federal breast-feeding discrimination cases); Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d
927 (4th Cir. 1988); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990); cf.
McNill v. New York City Dept. of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a
mother who was medically required to breast-feed her child in order for the child to survive
was not protected by the PDA because the PDA protected the medical conditions of the
mother, not the child).
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to accommodate her breast-feeding. 110 The plaintiff’s six-week old infant
would not eat unless fed from the plaintiff’s breast. 111 The court
characterized plaintiff’s request as “unrelated to any disability or medical
The court
condition associated with pregnancy or childbirth.” 112
continued, “[r]ather, her request was for personal leave, based on her
inability to wean her child from breast-feeding.” 113 The court noted that
the PDA changed the law after Gilbert, but did not interpret the statute to
include breast-feeding under “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
conditions.” 114 The court stated that if the legislature had intended to cover
a breast-feeding female employee’s childcare concerns, the legislature
should have specifically included that in Title VII or the PDA. 115
Courts have also declined to protect breast-feeding as a sex-plus
characteristic. In Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., the plaintiff brought action
against her employer under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (the “ADA”), alleging that her employer insufficiently accommodated
her desire to pump breast milk at work. 116 The court followed precedent on
the plaintiff’s ADA claim and held that pregnancy and related medical
conditions do not, lacking extraordinary conditions, constitute a disability
for the purposes of the ADA. 117 The court noted, however, that “[t]his . . .
is not to say that a statute requiring employers to afford reasonable
accommodation to women engaged in breast feeding or breast pumping
would be undesirable” but that the determination is for the legislature, not
the courts. 118 The court then turned to plaintiff’s Title VII claim. The
court defined gender discrimination as “favoring men while disadvantaging
women or vice versa,” and wrote that “[t]he drawing of distinctions among
persons of one gender on the basis of criteria that are immaterial to the
other, while in given cases perhaps deplorable, is not the sort of behavior
covered by Title VII.” 119
The court also denied the plaintiff’s Title VII sex-plus claim, finding that
the plaintiff was not similarly situated to male employees as required for a
prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination. 120 “To allow a claim based on
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 867-70.
See id. at 868.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 869.
See id. at 870.
See Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
See id.
Id. at 309.
Id.
See id. at 310. For support of this proposition, the court cited Coleman v. B-G
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sex-plus discrimination here would elevate breast milk pumping—alone—
to a protected status.” 121 Again, the court suggested that if breast milk
pumping is to be considered a protected class, then Congress should
designate it as such. 122
In Barrash v. Bowen, a female employee of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) claimed that she had been discriminated against
within the meaning of the PDA when she was denied a six-month leave to
breast-feed her newborn and subsequently terminated for failure to return
to work. 123 The district court performed a disparate impact analysis and
found that the new leave policy could not lawfully be applied to young
mothers wishing to breast-feed their newborns because as to them the
policy had a disparate impact. 124 But the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision for the plaintiff.125
The Fourth Circuit did not think a disparate impact analysis was
appropriate because such an analysis is appropriate only in cases of nondiscretionary acts; the grant of leave without pay is discretionary; and,
according to the collective bargaining agreement to which the plaintiff was
subject, employees cannot demand leave without pay. 126 The district court
had reasoned that the directive given to SSA managers to reduce the
amount of leave without pay given to employees substantially limited the
managers’ discretionary authority. 127 The Fourth Circuit interpreted the
limiting directive differently, reasoning that because the authorization of
leave was still technically discretionary, disparate impact analysis was not
appropriate. 128 In dicta, the Fourth Circuit found that even if the district
court’s premises were accepted, the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim
would still fail because the evidence comparing leaves given to
incapacitated men to leaves given to breast-feeding women was not
valid. 129 “Under the [PDA] pregnancy and related conditions must be
treated as illnesses only when incapacitating.” 130 The court wrote that
Maintenance Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1997).
121. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
122. See id.
123. 846 F.2d 927, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff was granted six months of
unpaid leave to breast-feed her first child. Before the birth of her second child, however, the
SSA was ordered to tighten its grants of leave without pay to cut costs and increase
efficiency. See id. at 928.
124. See id. at 929.
125. See id. at 932.
126. See id. at 931.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 931-32.
130. Id. at 931.
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“[o]ne can draw no valid comparison between people, male and female,
suffering extended incapacity from illness or injury and young mothers
wishing to nurse little babies.” 131 According to the Fourth Circuit, even if
granting leave without pay had not been discretionary, the plaintiff’s claim
would have failed for lack of an appropriate comparison group.
2. Pregnancy
Unlike discrimination against women due to breast-feeding, pregnancy
discrimination is covered by a specific piece of legislation: Title VII as
amended by the PDA. The PDA’s language itself limits its application, and
many courts, most notably the Seventh Circuit, have limited the statute’s
protections even further. The protections afforded to pregnant women are
insufficient.
In Maldonado v. U.S. Bank the Seventh Circuit purported to “restate [its]
position on pregnancy discrimination.” 132 The plaintiff applied for a teller
position at a bank. 133 She received a part-time position, but was fired
during training after notifying her supervisor that she was pregnant.134 The
plaintiff’s supervisor stated that she had estimated that the plaintiff would
have her child in July, and the bank needed an employee who could work
through the summer. 135 The Seventh Circuit found for the plaintiff but on
very narrow grounds, limiting its holding to the specific facts of the case:
“an employer cannot discriminate against a pregnant employee simply
because it believes pregnancy might prevent the employee from doing her
job.” 136 In fact, the court appeared to conclude that only women who
experience none of the normal side-effects of pregnancy and need no time
off to give birth or to recover from childbirth are covered by the PDA. 137
Maldonado relied heavily on a 1996 Seventh Circuit case, Troupe v.
May Department Stores Co., in which Judge Posner noted in dicta that an
employer can dismiss an employee due to excessive absences, even if the
absences were a result of the employee’s pregnancy. 138 “The [PDA] does
not, despite the urgings of feminist scholars, require employers to offer
maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to
work—to make it as easy, say, as it is for their spouses to continue working
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 931-32.
186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 764.
See id. at 764-65.
See id. at 765.
Id. at 761.
See id. at 766-68; see also Magid, supra note 61, at 826.
See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737-38 (7th Cir. 1994).
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during pregnancy.” 139 Maldonado continued to refine and reassert the
Seventh Circuit’s limited view of the PDA established in Troupe.
In a 2001 article Julie Manning Magid wrote that by the Seventh
Circuit’s definition of pregnancy discrimination, “it is impermissible to
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy alone but if pregnancy actually
manifests itself in any of the biological ways that it must manifest itself, an
employer can take adverse actions based on these ‘secondary effects.’”140
Magid used Maldonado as the centerpiece of her argument for a broader
reading of the PDA. She noted that the Maldonado court’s holding is
understandable given its misstatement of the purpose of the PDA.141
Further, Magid saw common stereotypes found in decisions about
pregnancy discrimination embedded in the court’s misstatement. For
example, the court held that pregnancy is a disability, and worse, a
disability that women choose to inflict upon themselves, thus women, not
their innocent employers should bear the burden of the choice.142 Magid
finally argued that the court’s holding in Maldonado encourages a woman
to hide a pregnancy from an employer for fear that one small
inconvenience to an employer could cost the woman her job. The result
would be that employers would not be able to plan for pregnant workers’
absences. 143 “Covering,” attempting to make an undesirable characteristic
such as pregnancy less obtrusive, is evident in the next case and will be
discussed more fully in Part II. 144
Clay v. Holy Cross Hospital shows one example of how covering can
hurt a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff in the long run. In Clay, a doctor
sued her former employer, alleging that she was terminated, in violation of
the PDA, because of her pregnancy. 145 The employer contended that the
plaintiff was fired because she was less likely to grow her practice than the
retained physicians and was unwilling to participate in hospital marketing

139. See id. at 738 (citations omitted).
140. Magid, supra note 61, at 829.
141. See id. at 830. The court stated that “the PDA was designed to allow individual
women to make independent choices about whether to continue to work while pregnant . . .
.” Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 767. This statement is not a true reflection of the congressional
record stating the purpose of amending Title VII to explicitly include pregnancy as gender
discrimination. Rather, one of the sponsors of the PDA, Senator Williams, explained that
the “entire thrust” of the PDA “is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and
equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in
family life.” Magid, supra note 61, at 830 (citations omitted).
142. See Magid, supra note 61, at 830-31.
143. See id. at 831.
144. See Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, § 6
(Magazine), at 32.
145. See Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 2001).
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efforts. 146 Initially the plaintiff concealed her pregnancy from her
employer, but she contended that her employer knew of her pregnancy
before her firing. 147 The court held that the plaintiff could not establish the
first prong of the prima facie case if her employer did not know about her
pregnancy. 148 Alternately the court held that the plaintiff’s pretext
argument was unavailing. 149 Judge Wood concurred in the judgment, but
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the record did not support the
plaintiff’s allegation that her employer knew about her pregnancy before
selecting her for the reduction-in-force. 150
Other circuits have adopted the Seventh Circuit’s pregnancy
discrimination jurisprudence as well. In In re Carnegie Center Associates,
a pregnant unmarried secretary’s position was eliminated as part of a
reduction-in-force during her maternity leave. 151 Before she left on
maternity leave, the plaintiff’s superiors made comments to her
encouraging her to marry. 152 The Third Circuit asked “whether terminating
an employee because she is absent on maternity leave is a violation of the
PDA” in its consideration of the plaintiff’s appeal.153
In deciding this question the court looked to Troupe and Smith v. F.W.
Morse & Co., Inc. 154 for guidance. In Smith, the First Circuit held that the
elimination of the plaintiff’s position while she was on maternity leave was
not an act of pregnancy discrimination.155 The court reasoned that the
employer discovered that the position was superfluous while the employee
was on maternity leave and that the PDA “does not command that an
employer bury its head in the sand and struthiously refrain from
implementing business judgments simply because they affect a parturient
Thus, the necessary nexus between the plaintiff’s
employee.” 156
termination and her pregnancy was missing. 157 The Third Circuit
differentiated Smith on the grounds that it did not involve an employer’s
decision as to which of several positions to eliminate, and ultimately found

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See id. at 1004.
See id. at 1006-07.
See id. at 1007 n.7.
See id. at 1007-09.
See id. at 1009-10 (Wood, J., concurring).
129 F.3d 290, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1997).
See id. at 293.
Id. at 295.
76 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 1996)
See id. at 425.
Id. at 424.
See id. at 425.
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that Smith was not controlling. 158
The court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Troupe and held
that an employer’s mere consideration of an employee’s maternity leave is
not a violation of the PDA. 159 “The PDA does not require an employer to
grant maternity leave or to reinstate an employee after a maternity leave.
The PDA merely requires that an employer treat a pregnant woman in the
same fashion as any other temporarily disabled employee.” 160 Thus, the
court denied the plaintiff’s claim of pregnancy discrimination.161
A lengthy dissent followed the majority’s opinion. The dissent took
issue with the majority’s equation of pregnancy-related disability with
temporary disabilities under the ADA. 162
If Congress intended to equate pregnancy with a temporary disability
under the ADA, it afforded pregnant women precious little protection
when it enacted the PDA. Pregnancy is by its nature temporary. Holding
that it is therefore equivalent of a “temporary disability” is hardly
consistent with “the social policies and aims to be furthered by Title VII
and filtered through the phrase ‘to discriminate’ contained in [that Act].”
Accordingly, we can only give effect to the intent behind this statute by
viewing the term “temporarily disabled” as it applies to pregnancy as
referring to the duration of the disability, not to the quality of it. 163

The dissent also argued that the majority should have been guided by
Smith, rather than following what it considered the flawed reasoning of
Troupe. 164 The dissent argued that both Troupe and the majority limit the
protection that Congress intended to provide when it enacted the PDA.165
The dissent reasoned that if the plaintiff in Troupe was terminated because
of tardiness caused by morning sickness (a condition of her pregnancy),
then she was terminated because of her pregnancy. 166 Instead, the dissent
argued, the majority should have found that the plaintiff’s employer clearly
did not put her maternity leave to one side when deciding to eliminate her
position and thus held that the decision to eliminate her job was based on

158. See In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1997).
159. See id. at 297.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 299.
162. See id. at 302-04 (McKee, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
164. See id. at 304-08.
165. See id. at 307. “[I]n using the broad phrase ‘women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth and related medical conditions,’ the [PDA] makes clear that its protection extends
to the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process.” H.R. REP. 95-948
(1978), at 5 (quoted in Carnegie, 129 F.3d at 307 (McKee, J., dissenting)).
166. See Carnegie, 129 F.3d at 307 (McKee, J., dissenting).
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her maternity leave. 167 “That causal nexus runs afoul of Title VII’s
prohibition of sex discrimination.” 168 The broader interpretation of Title
VII and the PDA argued for in In re Carnegie Center Associates’s dissent
has been embraced in some courts. And in California Federal Savings &
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Supreme Court offered a less proscribed view of
the PDA, holding that the PDA is a floor below which pregnancy disability
benefits may not fall, rather than a ceiling above which they may not
rise. 169 Thus, the PDA does not prevent employment practices that favor
pregnancy.
A recent case that read the PDA broadly is Erickson v. Bartell Drug
Co. 170 Erickson raised the question of whether or not the selective
exclusion of prescription contraceptives from an employer’s generally
comprehensive prescription plan constitutes sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII and particularly the PDA.171 The District Court for the
Western District of Washington held that “[i]n light of the fact that
prescription contraceptives are used only by women, [the employer’s]
choice to exclude that particular benefit from its generally applicable
benefit plan is discriminatory.” 172 In so holding, the court read the PDA
broadly.
Read in the context of Title VII as a whole, the PDA is a broad
acknowledgement of the intent of Congress to outlaw any and all
discrimination against any and all women in the terms and conditions of
their employment, including the benefits an employer provides to its
employees. Male and female employees have different, sex-based
disability and healthcare needs, and the law is no longer blind to the fact
that only women can get pregnant, bear children, or use prescription
contraception. The special or increased healthcare needs associated with a
woman’s unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the same extent,
and on the same terms as other healthcare needs.173
The Erickson court found that prescription contraceptives were covered
under the PDA because they fell within the phrase “pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions.”174 But the court also noted in dicta that the
decision to exclude prescription contraceptives from the prescription plan

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 308.
Id.
See 479 U.S. 272, 285-92 (1987).
141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
See id. at 1268.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1271.
See id. at 1274.
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would be sex discrimination under Title VII, even if it did not fall under the
PDA. 175
3. Childcare Responsibilities
Discrimination on the basis of childcare responsibilities affects many
working parents. Some scholars have recognized that the statutes that
address the work-family conflict (Title VII and the FMLA) are
insufficient. 176 Debbie N. Kaminer argued that Title VII is limited by its
focus on formal equality, and courts interpreting Title VII have been
generally unwilling to require differential treatment for men and women.177
Kaminer also argued that the FMLA is insufficient because it provides only
unpaid leave and does not help parents with their day-to-day childcare
obligations. 178 The insufficiency of the current statutory scheme is evident
in the following cases.
In Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., a female television producer sued her
employer, claiming, among other things, sex-plus discrimination under
Title VII. 179 When the plaintiff returned to work from maternity leave, she
requested and was given a different schedule to better accommodate her
childcare needs. 180 More than two years after returning from maternity
leave, the defendant changed the plaintiff’s schedule, despite the plaintiff’s
protestations that the new schedule would not be feasible because of her
childcare responsibilities.181 The plaintiff’s employer again asked her if
she would work the altered schedule, and the plaintiff repeated that she
could not because she did not have childcare.182 As a result, the plaintiff’s
employer gave her a memo that asked her to resign because she would not
work the adjusted schedule. 183 The plaintiff refused to sign the memo and

175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 15, at 307.
177. See id.
178. See id. Kaminer suggested new legislation that would be based on section 701(j) of
Title VII, which mandates religious accommodation in the workplace. See id. at 308.
Kaminer favors this balancing approach because it is based on accommodation rather than
formal equality; it recognizes the needs of employer and employee and forces the
accommodation of a parent only when an employer would not suffer undue hardship. See
id. at 308-09. Greater discussion of Kaminer’s remedy and other remedies can be found in
Part II. See infra notes 336-41 and accompanying text.
179. See 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 210-11 (D. Conn. 2004).
180. See id. at 211.
181. See id. The plaintiff was requested to work the 4:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. shift, but
because her husband, a police officer, worked the night shift, the schedule change would
mean that the plaintiff’s child would be left unattended from 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
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was fired. 184
The plaintiff alleged sex-plus discrimination, citing the fact that she had
a child as the plus factor.185 The court did not agree with her
characterization and thought the correct characterization was sex plus
The court required that the “second
“childcare difficulties.” 186
characteristic also be protected by antidiscrimination statutes.” 187 The
court noted that “the courts which have considered the issue have held that
child care is a gender-neutral trait,” 188 and held that “child-rearing is not a
sex-plus characteristic protected by Title VII, the [PDA], or any other
federal or state antidiscrimination statute.” 189 Further, the court held that
the plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action. 190
Interestingly the Guglietta court did not cite Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., a 1971 pre-PDA case of gender discrimination in which the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit’s grant of summary
judgment for an employer. 191 In Phillips, the plaintiff’s claim of gender
discrimination was based on the employer’s refusal to accept applications
from women with pre-school age children, but not from men with children
of the same age. 192 The Court suggested that it was perhaps possible to
establish a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
usual operation of the employer’s business by showing that some women
with pre-school age children have childcare responsibilities that hamper job
performance and that men do not normally have those responsibilities.193
This portion of the Court’s opinion included many embedded assumptions
about women’s role as childcare giver, assumptions that Justice Marshall
identified in his concurrence. 194 “I fear that . . . the Court has fallen into
the trap of assuming that [Title VII] permits ancient canards about the

184. See id.
185. See id. at 213.
186. See id. at 213-14.
187. Id. at 213. But see Witt v. County Ins. & Fin. Servs., No. 04C3938, 2004 WL
2644397, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2004) (discrimination based on sex plus marriage or sex
plus familial status is actionable).
188. Guglietta, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 215.
191. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). “The Court thus
created a cause of action for ‘gender-plus’ discrimination; that is, Title VII not only forbids
discrimination against women in general, but also discrimination against subclasses of
women, such as women with pre-school-age children.” Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of
Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1997) (gender plus marital status case).
192. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543.
193. See id. at 544.
194. See id. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination. Congress, however,
Marshall continued, “[e]ven
sought just the opposite result.” 195
characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve
as predicates for restricting employment opportunity. The exception for a
‘bona fide occupational qualification’ was not intended to swallow the
rule.” 196 The biases seen in Phillips have not disappeared in more recent
cases.
In Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., the plaintiff alleged discrimination
based on her status as a new mother under the PDA. 197 The plaintiff was
demoted while on maternity leave, allegedly because of her failure to send
eighty-three acknowledgement letters to donors.198 The plaintiff’s new
position had fewer responsibilities and a salary about half that of her old
position. 199 The plaintiff claimed that when she spoke with her employer
about the new position, the executive director told her that she was being
given a position “for a new mom to handle.” 200 The plaintiff did not accept
the new position, and the person who took the position received as much as
the plaintiff had received in the position she held before her maternity
leave. 201 The plaintiff brought a Title VII action against her employer
alleging pregnancy discrimination.202 The Eighth Circuit asked “whether
being discriminated against because of one’s status as a new parent is
‘because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions,’ and therefore violative of the PDA” and concluded that a
woman’s decision to care for a child is not a medical condition related to
childbirth or pregnancy, instead it is “a social role chosen by all new
parents who make the decision to raise a child.” 203 Thus, the plaintiff’s
claim of pregnancy discrimination based on her status as a new parent
failed. 204
The Piantanida court emphasized that deciding to take care of a child is
a choice, and a choice that can be made by any person, man or woman.205
“An employer’s discrimination against an employee who has accepted this
parental role—reprehensible as this discrimination might be—is therefore
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 545.
Id.
See 116 F.3d 340, 341-43 (8th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 341.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
See id.
See id.
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not based on the gender-specific biological functions of pregnancy and
child-bearing, but rather is based on a gender-neutral status potentially
possessible by all employees . . . .” 206 Though stereotypes may be
embedded in the court’s decision in this case, the court’s decision, like
other PDA childcare cases, shows the limits of the PDA.
The Colorado District Court in Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. held that
breast-feeding and child rearing are not conditions within the scope of the
PDA and, therefore, refusing to provide an employee with a part-time
schedule to accommodate her breast-feeding or childcare responsibilities is
not conduct protected by Title VII. 207 The court also discussed whether or
not a plaintiff need be pregnant at the time the alleged discrimination took
place in order to file a claim under the PDA. 208 The court determined that
a plaintiff must “show she was pregnant at or near the time of the alleged
discrimination.” 209 In this case, where the plaintiff’s termination occurred
less than three months after she gave birth and only three weeks after the
end of her medical leave, the court determined that the plaintiff was a
member of the protected class.210 Though the plaintiff here lost her Title
VII claim, summary judgment was denied to her employer on her FMLA
claim. 211
II. NARROW READINGS & INSUFFICIENT STATUTES EQUAL
INSUFFICIENT COVERAGE
Many courts have read the statutes narrowly and limited protections.
But the statutes themselves also provide limited protections—for example,
it is difficult, even on a broad reading, to find that the PDA covers
childcare concerns. There are issues that the PDA simply did not grapple
with, and those things need to be grappled with if women are going to have
the opportunity to participate actually in a fair and equal workforce. Legal
theorists have argued for a broader interpretation and, in some cases, new
statutes that would offer more protections. First I will discuss the current
status of the law affecting discrimination against pregnant women and
mothers. Then I will discuss the many reasons why the status quo is
harmful to women and various proposals for change.

206. Id. See also Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. for the Deaf, 611 F. Supp.
905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (child rearing is gender neutral).
207. 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D. Colo. 1997).
208. See id. at 1492-93.
209. Id. at 1493.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 1497.
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A. Narrow Readings
The way the statutes have been applied to pregnancy, motherhood, and
childcare responsibilities has not been consistent across the circuits, and
many courts have narrowed the statutes’ scope of protections. 212 “[A]
prevailing view is that sex discrimination concerning pregnancy occurs, if
at all, within the nine months of the female employee’s biological
pregnancy.” 213 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has taken a very narrow
view of the PDA—a view that is likely narrower than that which was
intended by the drafters of the PDA. 214 According to the Seventh Circuit,
in cases like Maldonado, only women who experience none of the expected
side effects of pregnancy and need no time off from work to give birth or to
recover from childbirth are covered by the PDA. 215 Other circuits have
adopted the Seventh Circuit’s narrow view of the PDA as well.216 Though
all circuits have not read the statute so narrowly, the Seventh Circuit’s
pregnancy discrimination jurisprudence has created a trend towards
limiting the PDA’s scope.
Troupe v. May Department Stores Co. is one of the cases that
contributed to the Seventh Circuit’s narrowing trend. In that case the

212. Title VII protects against discrimination “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex,”
but, because several courts have held that childcare is gender neutral, discrimination against
a woman because of her childcare responsibilities cannot be on its own “because of sex” or
“on the basis of sex.” See, e.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir.
1997); Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004). These
holdings have limited the protections available to women who seek judicial action because
of discrimination based on their childcare responsibilities. A Title VII sex-plus claim may
still be possible, but as seen in Part I, such claims have been largely unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Guglietta, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 213-14 (plaintiff’s sex-plus claim was not viable because court
required that the second characteristic also be covered by antidiscrimination statutes and
childcare is gender-neutral). But see Witt v. County Ins. & Fin. Servs., No. 04C3938, 2004
WL 2644397, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2004) (discrimination based on sex plus marriage or
sex plus familial status is actionable).
213. Magid, supra note 61, at 850. Magid also notes that limiting the PDA’s protection
to the nine months of a woman’s pregnancy is inconsistent with the PDA, which explicitly
protects women from pregnancy discrimination “before, during and after her pregnancy.”
See id. at 850-51. “There is, in sum, a point at which pregnancy and immediate post-partum
requirements—clearly gender-based in nature—end and gender-neutral child care activities
begin.” Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Md. 1994) (granting
summary judgment to employer on plaintiff’s claim that she was discriminated against in
the meaning of Title VII because of the parental leave she took following maternity leave).
214. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank,
186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999); Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
215. See Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 766-68.
216. See, e.g., Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2003) (adopting the Seventh
Circuit’s narrow view of pregnancy discrimination); In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d
290 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Seventh Circuit specifically said that employers do not have an affirmative
duty to offer maternity leave or make it easier for pregnant women to work
under the PDA. 217 Judge Posner wrote that “[e]mployers can treat pregnant
women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant
employees, even to the point of ‘conditioning the availability of an
employment benefit on an employee’s decision to return to work after the
end of the medical disability that pregnancy causes.’” 218 Posner also wrote
that under the PDA an employer must ignore the employee’s pregnancy but
not her absence from work. 219 Though on its face this proposition may
seem reasonable, it leads to the conclusion that pregnant women cannot be
discriminated against on the basis of their pregnancy but they can be
discriminated against on the basis of the side effects of that pregnancy. 220
All circuits have not read the statute so narrowly, however, despite the
trend toward limiting the PDA’s scope that the Seventh Circuit’s pregnancy
discrimination jurisprudence has created. In Erickson, the plaintiff asserted
that her employer’s exclusion of prescription contraceptives from the
company prescription plan was sex discrimination within the purviews of
Title VII and the PDA. 221 The district court in Erickson looked beyond the
letter of the statute and analyzed the congressional intent of the PDA and
relevant Supreme Court decisions.222 The court wrote that, “the PDA is not
a begrudging recognition of a limited grant of rights to a strictly defined
group of women who happen to be pregnant.” 223 Erickson read the PDA
broadly in two important ways. First, the court did not restrict the PDA’s
application to women who are physically pregnant at the time the alleged
discrimination occurs. 224 Second, the court read the PDA to require
employers to take affirmative action on the part of women if that is
necessary to treat the sexes the same. 225 While some courts have declined
to extend the PDA to women who gave birth just weeks or months ago, the
Erickson court found that prescription contraceptives were covered by the
217. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738.
218. Id. (citing Maganuco v. Leyuden Cty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 445 (7th
Cir. 1991)).
219. See id.
220. See, e.g., Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 766-68; see also Magid, supra note 61, at 826.
Though the case alleged intentional discrimination, Posner noted in dicta that disparate
impact is a viable theory for pregnancy discrimination, but it is properly understood as “a
means of dealing with the residues of past discrimination, rather than a warrant for
favoritism.” See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738.
221. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
222. See id. at 1268-71.
223. Id. at 1271.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1270.
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PDA because they were included in the phrase “pregnancy, childbirth, or
related conditions,” showing that a broader interpretation than those
readings conventionally given of the PDA is possible. 226
Evidentiary standards also play a substantial role in determining how
narrowly or broadly the statutes are read. Different circuits use different
evidentiary standards, and the use of heightened evidentiary standards has
sometimes narrowed the scope of protections. 227 Evidence in pregnancy
discrimination cases is rarely considered to be direct evidence and, thus, the
McDonnell Douglas test is most often used. 228 But the fourth prong of
McDonnell Douglas, that similarly situated employees who are not
members of the protected class received superior treatment, presents
problems for pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs, and a different burden is
placed on the plaintiff depending on the circuit.229 Julie Manning Magid
criticized the courts for continuing to require a comparison group for
pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs when so often a similarly situated group
simply does not exist. 230 For example, in Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., the court
denied the plaintiff’s Title VII sex-plus claim of sex plus breast-milk
pumping because the plaintiff could not state a prima facie case—she could
not identify similarly situated male employees. 231 Logically a group of
226. See id. at 1274.
227. See, e.g., EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.6 (10th
Cir. 2000) (fourth element of McDonnell Douglas test can be satisfied in several ways);
Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff did not establish
the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas test because she did not show that she was treated
less favorably than similarly situated non-pregnant employees because she was pregnant).
228. See Magid, supra note 61, at 839.
Courts define the requirement for direct evidence as that which, if believed by the
trier of fact, proves discrimination without relying upon inference of presumption.
However, requiring a question to be answered without drawing any inferences
from what was said or done ignores the reality that, ‘all knowledge is inferential.’
Id. at 845 (citations omitted).
229. Compare Coney v. Dallas Hous. Auth., No. 3-01-CV-2337-L, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1803, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2003) (plaintiff did not establish fourth prong of
McDonnell Douglas test because she did not identify employees similarly situated to her
who were more favorably treated), with Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1195
n.6 (fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas test does not require “a plaintiff to compare herself
to similarly-situated co-workers”).
230. See Magid, supra note 61, at 838-39. And “[t]hose circuits that have held plaintiffs
to a higher standard under the McDonnell Douglas analysis in the past, have signaled they
will continue to do so despite the Reeves decision.” Id. at 842. In Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products the Supreme Court concluded that if a plaintiff established a prima facie
case of discrimination and had sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that the
employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action was pretext, then
the fact finder could conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. See 530 U.S.
133, 146-47 (2000).
231. See 49 F. Supp. 2d. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d

REUTER_CHRISTENSEN

20xx]

2/3/2011 10:20 PM

DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE

129

lactating male employees in need of a breast-feeding accommodation did
not exist, but this did not stop the court from requiring it. Similarly, in
Barrash v. Bowen, a disparate impact case, the court found that “[o]ne can
draw no valid comparison between people, male and female, suffering
extended incapacity from illness or injury and young mothers wishing to
nurse little babies.” 232 The court required a showing that women were
treated less favorably than men in order to invalidate the rule. 233 The
obvious condescension of the court towards the woman in Barrash showed
a lack of respect for pregnancy discrimination claims. These types of
impossible-to-meet evidentiary burdens are common.
Although FMLA decisions have not been discussed extensively in this
Comment, many courts have read the FMLA narrowly as well. 234 For
example, a mother was not entitled to use the FMLA leave to move her
teenage son in with relatives because she was not moving him so he could
receive medical or psychological treatment, but instead to protect him from
repeated beatings by his peers.235 Like the PDA, the FMLA has often been
interpreted narrowly, but the narrowness of the statute itself is of most
interest in this Comment. The ways in which the statutes are constrained
by limitations built into their texts are discussed in the next section.
B. Insufficient Statutes
Narrow interpretations alone do not account for the gaps in protection
from discrimination for pregnant women and mothers—the statutes
themselves are insufficient to protect pregnant women and mothers from
discrimination on that basis. The way the drafters of Title VII conceived of
discrimination is important to understand the limits of the statute. “The
simplicity of the original statutory scheme indicated a Congressional
assessment of discrimination in 1964 as an important issue and an
unacceptable practice, but also as a simple and obvious occurrence that

927 (4th Cir. 1988).
232. 846 F.2d at 931-32.
233. See id. at 932.
234. See, e.g., O’Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th
Cir. 2000) (woman was discharged while on FMLA leave as part of a reduction in force).
But see Naomi S. Stern, The Challenges of Parental Leave Reforms for French and
American Women: A Call for a Revived Feminist-Socialist Theory, 28 VT. L. REV. 321, 329
n.49 (2004) (“relatively generous interpretations of the FMLA do . . . exist in federal court
decisions”).
235. See Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999)
(plaintiff had no specific plans to seek treatment for her son once she reached the
Philippines).
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could be easily remedied.” 236 Since 1964, the statute has been amended
several times to account for less obvious forms of discrimination. 237 The
drafters of the PDA, like the original Title VII, assumed that protecting
against pregnancy discrimination would be simple and easy to
implement. 238 But it has been anything but simple to rectify discrimination
against women who “are at a biological disadvantage in a culturally created
employment situation.” 239 Title VII as amended by the PDA mandates that
men and women (even pregnant women) be treated equally, 240 but does not
acknowledge that pregnancy is a gender difference that, while not grounds
for discrimination, must be recognized. 241 This major limitation comes
from the statute as drafted, not the statute as applied.
The PDA’s application after a woman has a child is limited by the very
text of the statute. In order to be covered by the PDA the woman must
have been discriminated “because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 242 While some courts have read
the message of the PDA rather than the letter and held that it covers such
things as prescription contraceptives, 243 the majority of courts require that
a woman be discriminated against in a way that is temporally and
thematically related to her pregnancy in order to be covered.244 For

236. Kathryn Branch, Note, Are Women Worth as Much as Men?: Employment
Inequities, Gender Roles, and Public Policy, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119, 146
(1994).
237. See id. at 146-47.
238. See id. at 148.
239. Id. at 149.
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). One court said the PDA was designed “to address
the stereotype that ‘women are less desirable employees because they are liable to become
pregnant,’ and to insure that the decision whether to work while pregnant ‘was reserved for
each individual woman to make for herself.’” Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762
(7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). That court continued on, however, somewhat
anachronistically, to write that “under the PDA, employers are not required to give pregnant
women special treatment; they must only treat them the same as all other employees.” Id.
241. See Branch, supra note 236, at 149.
242. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1982).
243. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(holding that the selective exclusion of prescription contraceptives from an employer’s
generally comprehensive prescription plan constitutes sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII and the PDA).
244. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (a woman’s
decision to care for a child is not covered by the PDA); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960
F. Supp. 1487, 1492-93 (D. Colo. 1997) (a plaintiff must show “she was pregnant at or near
the time of the alleged discrimination”); Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. for the
Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (alleged discrimination was caused by
plaintiff’s desire to take a childcare leave, not a pregnancy leave; that sort of discrimination
is not covered by the PDA).
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example, in Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. the District Court of Colorado
determined that a plaintiff must show that “she was pregnant at or near the
time of the alleged discrimination.”245 The court determined that the
plaintiff was a part of the protected class because her termination occurred
less than three months after she gave birth and only three weeks after her
medical leave had ended.246 It is unclear where courts will draw the line,
but it is clear that it would be difficult to use the PDA to protect women
with childcare concerns when the time period covered by the PDA is so
short and the statute is so necessarily tied to the physical act of childbirth.
Breast-feeding cases have faced similar problems. Courts have held that
breast-feeding is not covered by the PDA, the ADA, or as a sex-plus
characteristic under Title VII. 247 Courts have characterized breast-feeding
as outside the purview of the PDA. 248 Some courts have, however,
suggested that breast-feeding be specifically included in Title VII or the
PDA, 249 and other courts have suggested that a breast-feeding and breastpumping accommodations statute would be a positive step forward.250 But
regardless of whether judges have thought that a new or existing statute
should cover breast-feeding, it is, as of now, not covered by any statute,
and the existing laws are not broad enough to include breast-feeding under
their canopies of protection.
The FMLA is limited in many obvious ways, most notably in that it does
not apply to all American workers and provides for only unpaid leave.251
In those ways it is limited by design—for the statute to make it through
Congress it had to be limited. According to some, the FMLA is limited in
other important ways as well: it sends implicit messages to American
women that women are dependent on men, that men are society’s
breadwinners, that women are the primary caretakers of children, and that
women are less dedicated in the workplace than their male counterparts.252
The FMLA’s drafters may not have intended these limitations, but because
of the compromises made in order to pass the statute, the FMLA may have
emerged in a form that despite good intentions, does almost as much harm
as it does good.

245. 960 F. Supp. at 1493.
246. See id.
247. See supra notes 100-131 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
249. See Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Wallace, 789
F. Supp. at 870.
250. See Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
252. See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 441-45.
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The FMLA also contains the cultural values of the government that
enacted it. 253 In 1993 when the FMLA was enacted, the country was at the
height of new momism, according to Susan J. Douglas and Meredith M.
Michaels, authors of THE MOMMY MYTH. 254 New momism dictates that
mothers are the best primary caretakers of their children and that in order to
be a good mother, a woman must devote all of her time, energy, and
attention to her child. 255 “The new momism does not demand that a
woman stay at home with her children, but instead asserts that women have
been to the workforce and now should make the ‘right’ choice to stay at
home with their children.” 256 Douglas and Michaels argue that these
heightened ideals are bad for mothers, particularly working mothers.257
According to Douglas and Michaels, new momism began in the 1970s and
progressed through the celebrity mothers and sensationalized fear of child
abduction and molestation in daycare of the 1980s to the fear of germs and
perfection of the heightened standards of motherhood in the 1990s. 258 In

253. See id. at 441.
254. See id. at 434.
255. See id. at 431-32. Douglas and Michaels describe new-momism as
the insistence that no woman is complete or fulfilled unless she has kids, that
women remain the best primary caretakers of children, and that to be a remotely
decent mother, a woman has to devote her entire physical, psychological,
emotional, and intellectual being, 24/7, to her children. The new momism is a
highly romanticized and yet demanding view of motherhood in which the
standards for success are impossible to meet.
Shattering ‘The Mommy Myth’, MSNBC, Feb. 5, 2004 (quoting from SUSAN DOUGLAS &
MEREDITH MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT
HAS
UNDERMINED
WOMEN,
(Simon
&
Schuster
2004)),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4163361/.
256. Dickerson, supra note 99, at 432.
257. In an interview with USA TODAY, Douglas said, “[W]orking moms have been
especially guilt-tripped. . . . The chic thing to do now, though is to be able to work but to
CHOOSE to stay home with your children. That is seen as the morally superior thing to do.
But very few mothers can do that. Most moms work because they have to.” Peterson, supra
note 41, at 6D. But see Suzanne Venker, Angry Mothers Get Back to the Office!, NAT’L
REV.
ONLINE,
May
7,
2004,
available
at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/venker200405071112.asp
(“Unfortunately,
Douglas and Michaels have not done their homework. If they had, they’d know . . . that
most women choose to be home with their children. Of course, the authors do not accept
this fact (‘For most mothers, work is an absolute necessity’) and thus resent anyone who
disagrees with their philosophy.”).
258. See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 432-34. In an interview with SALON, Douglas said,
[T]he media discovered that the family was changing in the late ‘70s, early ‘80s,
and children became a big story. But children became an even bigger story, and
so you got these media panics. You got sensationalized stories about children in
danger: Razor blades in Halloween candy, pajamas that caught on fire by
themselves almost, day-care centers staffed by Satanists and pedophiles. That was
all out of proportion to the risks that real children were facing, but it made
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an interview, Douglas explained what a mother is expected to do in order to
be considered a good mother.
We have gone back to the doting mom of the 1950s, to June Cleaver. But
the standards are even higher. She was not supposed to pipe Mozart near
her womb so this perfectly tuned child came out, or drill him with flash
cards when he was [six] months old or expect him to read THE ILIAD by
the time he was [four]. Later she did not have to drive him [ten] hours
round trip to a soccer match or do endless arts and crafts with him while
building a fun house in the back yard.
We are expected to actually be in our children’s heads, knowing what
they need before they need it. God forbid that if a child is riding in a car
that he should not have a pack of educational toys with him so that he will
have an enriching experience. 259

By the 1990s the new momism was perfected, and its heightened ideals of
motherhood were influencing American society; it was then that the weak
FMLA was passed. 260
The values of new momism are echoed in the assumptions and effects of
the FMLA. 261 The FMLA casts mothers in the role of primary caretaker of
children. 262 Under the structure set up by the FMLA, the mother is the
more financially and culturally able parent to take unpaid leave following
the birth of a child.263 If the mother is the parent who stays at home
immediately following the birth of a child, she naturally learns more about
taking care of the child, automatically placing the father in a position of
secondary care. 264 Though a first-time mother and father may start out
with the same level of parenting skills, the perception is that mothers are
more skilled, which often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 265 “Because
the patterns of care-taking are established in the days and weeks following
the birth or adoption of the child, the FMLA ensures that the burden for
mothers terrified to let their kids out of their sight. So fear was important.
The other thing was fantasy. Again, the media responded to women when we
were looking for role models. Who’s a better role model, in some ways, than a
celebrity mom because celebrity mothers were working outside the home, but they
were having children. So we got the explosion in the ‘80s of the celebrity mom
profile, something you just didn’t see in ‘70s women’s magazines.
Feb.
19,
2004,
Amy
Reiter,
The
Mommy
Mystique,
SALON,
http://dir.salon.com/story/mwt/feature/2004/02/19/mommy_myth/index.html.
259. Peterson, supra note 41, at 6D.
260. See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 434-35.
261. See id. at 441-42.
262. See id. at 442.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 443.
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caregiving falls on the mother.” 266 By the time a father attempts to be a
caregiver, he has already been put into a secondary role. 267
The FMLA assumes that a secondary source of income exists that will
allow leave-takers to take an unpaid leave of absence from work. 268 The
FMLA presumes that mothers are not the breadwinners of their families; it
presumes that women are dependent on their husbands. 269 The traditional
family structure is embedded in the FMLA, and the traditional structure is
reinforced and encouraged by the new momism. The traditional family
structure remains an ideal of American society and one of the tenets of the
male-centric job model even though it is not the norm—most families do
not operate in the 1950s paradigm of working father, stay-at-home mother,
two kids, and a dog. 270 By assuming that families are structured in a
traditional way, the FMLA largely ignores single parents and even dualearner households where the woman’s income is as integral to family
survival as the man’s. 271 And because more women than men take leave
under the FMLA, the lack of compensation affects women more than it
affects men. 272 Unpaid leave undervalues women by assuming that women
can afford to take leave “because [their incomes are] not essential to their
livelihood” and “that a mother’s financial contribution and involvement in
the workplace are insignificant.” 273 Women are worth less than men in the
labor market because concepts of traditional sex roles continue to result in
the assignment of responsibility for childcare to women. 274
The FMLA also perpetuates the stereotype that women are less
committed to their jobs, because their focus is on their families.275 The
time when most women have children coincides with the crucial years of
advancement (to tenure, partner, vice-president, or management, for
example). 276 Employers assume from past experience that their employees
will follow gender norms and the women will be less committed to the
workforce while the men strive to get ahead to support their growing
families. 277 Women are penalized because their employers perceive that

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 442.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 444.
Id.
See Branch, supra note 236, at 119.
See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 443.
See id.
See id.
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they will have children and leave the workforce, at least temporarily.278
“By ensuring that the mother of the child is the parent who takes family
leave, the FMLA substantiates, validates, and reinforces the logical
gambles that employers take that women are not committed to the
workforce.” 279 The FMLA’s intention was to help women balance their
work and family obligations, but it has also “served to perpetuate the
underlying stereotypes that are the basis of workplace discrimination.”280
Though the FMLA may have helped women in certain practical ways, it
has also reinforced and validated the work-family model that places women
at a disadvantage to men in the workplace.
In 1994, Kathryn Branch wrote these hopeful words in a note about
gender inequities:
Family leave is a gender-neutral concept; its purpose is to strengthen the
valuation of family in our country by allowing all willing parents the
opportunity to make family commitments. Passage of the FMLA allows
men the option to take time to care for children without penalty that most
fathers would not otherwise have. Although cultural taboos against men
taking paternity leave still exist, the FMLA is one step towards changing
public perception of appropriate gender roles and valuation of the
family. 281

Branch’s words reflect the mission of the FMLA as stated in its
preamble. But that mission statement was not fulfilled, and, unfortunately
and perhaps through self-fulfilling prophecy, the FMLA’s critics were
right, or at least not wrong. The FMLA did not dramatically help women,
or at least not in any appreciable way; instead it reaffirmed and perpetuated
the status quo. 282 By effectively preserving the status quo, the FMLA
“perpetuates the legal subordination of women.” 283 The FMLA guarantees
a floor of parental accommodation beneath which covered employers may
not dip, but it does not “challenge the workplace or family structures that
were in place prior [sic] its passage; instead its embedded assumptions,
norms and values perpetuate the mother as the only caregiver of children,
which is the status quo.” 284 The status quo subordinates women, and
legislation like the FMLA recognizes that subordination is a problem but

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See id. at 443-44.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Branch, supra note 236, at 141.
See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 444.
Id.
Id. at 445.
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does nothing to remedy it. 285
C. Critiques of the Current Statutory Framework
This section builds on the discussion in the previous section and points
out some of the harms caused by the statutory framework—as written or as
applied. Major gaps in coverage exist. For example, Title VII and the
FMLA do not apply to all employers or all employees because of
requirements about the size of the employer and the number of hours the
employee has worked in the last year. But this section is more concerned
with the less obvious holes in coverage and the ways those holes affect
women. Subtle forms of discrimination are not adequately protected
against by the current statutory scheme. This section takes up the biases
within the courts themselves, the realities of the workplace, and the
phenomenon of covering to show the ways in which the status quo is
harmful to women.
1. The Harm of the Status Quo
a. Biases in Judicial Opinions
Biases and embedded assumptions about mothers and pregnant women
are not limited to home and the workplace (and perhaps the statutes), but
are also found in judicial opinions. Such assumptions are not only present
in older cases—where one might think they would be more prevalent—but
are found in recent cases as well. In Satty, one of the Supreme Court cases
that led to the PDA, the Court wrote, “[T]hat holding does not allow us to
read [the statute] to permit an employer to burden female employees in
such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of
their different role.” 286 The Court assumes that women and men have
different roles to play in society. But in Satty, a pre-PDA case, this
embedded assumption about women is not so shocking. Similarly, the
Supreme Court’s embedded assumptions in Phillips v. Marietta Corp., a
1971 pre-PDA case, were not unexpected.287 There the Court asserted that
“[t]he existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably
more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man, could
arguably be a basis for distinction under [Title VII].” 288 What was ahead
of its time was Justice Marshall’s concurrence where he wrote that the
285.
286.
287.
288.

See id.
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977).
400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Id. at 544.
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Court could not use its beliefs about the proper role of women as a basis to
permit discrimination.289
What is more shocking is that in a post-PDA world where most women
work, the same embedded assumptions and biases can still be seen in court
opinions. For example, in Wallace, a 1990 case, the court commented that
the plaintiff needed leave because of “her inability to wean her child from
breast-feeding.” 290 In that snide comment the court appears to be
criticizing the plaintiff’s mothering skills. Because this comment could be
interpreted as belittling the plaintiff for her poor parenting and thus
perpetuating high, almost impossible-to-attain standards for motherhood, it
could be linked to the phenomenon of new momism discussed earlier in
Part II. The comment could also be seen as looking down on mothers and
relegating motherhood to a realm other than that of the male workplace and
definitely inferior to it. Either way, the comment contains embedded
assumptions about motherhood.
Another more recent case that exhibits a court’s (or perhaps an entire
circuit’s) biases and embedded assumptions is Guglietta v. Meredith
Corp. 291 In Guglietta the plaintiff characterized herself as a “woman with
a child” for the purposes of her Title VII claim, but the court disagreed and
thought a better characterization was “woman with childcare
difficulties.” 292 Following a thought process similar to the Seventh
Circuit’s pregnancy jurisprudence, the court reasoned that a woman cannot
be discriminated against for having a child but she can be discriminated
against for having a real child with real needs (such as the need for an adult
to be at home at night while that child is sleeping). This creates a bias
against all women with children because one can assume that all children
have needs and that those needs will, from time to time, create childcare
problems for their parents. Thus, “woman with a child” as differentiated
from “woman with childcare difficulties” is an arbitrary distinction that
discriminates against women.
2. Harm in the Workplace
The ways in which a more family-friendly statutory scheme would
benefit employees, and perhaps society at large, have been discussed
exhaustively in this Comment, but there has been little discussion of what
the effect would be on employers. Discrimination against pregnant women

289.
290.
291.
292.

See id. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
301 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Conn. 2004).
Id. at 214.
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and mothers and un-family-friendly work environments may actually be
harmful to business as well as to employees. In England, just forty-seven
percent of women return to work at the companies where they worked
before they became pregnant.293 Some companies, however, have created
family-friendly policies that improved their retention rates. 294 For
example, at BT, a British telecom giant, ninety-nine percent of its female
employees return to work at the company after their maternity leaves.295
BT attributes this statistic to its flexible approach to work patterns
(including allowing employees to work from home) and its generous
maternity package. 296 Flexible policies have been similarly successful in
the United States. 297
There are many ways in which a more family-friendly statutory scheme
would benefit employers. Some employers have found that offering
childcare is a way to attract better employees.298 And other employers
have learned that family-friendly policies make employees happy, and that
happy employees make productive employees. 299 Take breast-feeding for
example—breast-pumping accommodation in the workplace is perhaps
logistically at least the easiest change to effectuate, and it may benefit
employers. It is widely known that breast-feeding is good for the mother
and infant, but adopting policies that enable women to breast-feed their
children can be economically sound for the employers as well.300 Working
women who breast-feed their children are less often late to and absent from
work due to their children because their children are usually healthier.301
Also, increased productivity and job satisfaction have been seen when
employers adopt breast-feeding friendly policies. 302 By encouraging
breast-feeding, employers encourage women to stay in the work force,
reducing turnover. 303 And because breast-feeding is so beneficial for both
the mother and child, it can reduce healthcare costs as well.304 Seeing
293. Management Issues News, Parent-friendly Policies Boost Maternity Return Rates,
MANAGEMENT-ISSUES,
Sept.
9,
2005,
http://www.managementissues.com/display_page.asp?id=2536&section=research.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See Dale Neal, Putting Children First Makes Good Business Sense, THE ASHEVILLE
CITIZEN-TIMES (N.C.), Nov. 14, 2005, at 3W.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See Christrup, supra note 54, at 476-77.
301. See id. at 477.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 478.
304. See id. at 477-78; see also Roni Rabin, Breast-Feed or Else, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
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employees as parents as well as employees and making room for that in the
workplace can be as good for employers as it is for the employed.
An article for the New York Law Journal by Holly English, a practicing
attorney and author, in which English answered questions from women
concerned about how having children will affect their legal careers, offers a
window into what it is like for pregnant women and mothers in the real
world. 305 English’s article depicts the bleak landscape for working women
who desire to have children. It is important to note, however, that because
English’s article is targeted at lawyers, and the law is a particularly
demanding profession, the landscape presented is extreme. 306 And even
within the legal profession, there are law firms with family-friendly
policies that they truly stand behind and enforce. English’s answers expose
the biases and stereotypes faced by women and the lack of respect
employers give anti-discrimination statutes.
One young woman asked English whether getting pregnant after
working at a law firm for one year would “be off-putting, create havoc at
the firm, or demonstrate that [she is] not committed.”307 English answered
that although pregnancy discrimination is illegal, it happens all the time,
and is very difficult to prove. 308 English suggested that the young woman
be aware of that reality and build that awareness into the timing of her
pregnancy. 309 English noted that people running law firms expressed
frustration to her that women begin work at the firm, get pregnant, and
leave their jobs. 310 “[Legal employers] wind up making assumptions,
based on past experience, that once a woman has children she will be less
committed to her job.” 311 Thus, to be successful, according to English, a
2006, at F1 (science overwhelmingly supports the many benefits of breast-feeding,
including that breast-fed children are less vulnerable to many infectious diseases).
305. Holly English, Oh Baby! Pregnancy Discrimination is Illegal, But Then There is
Reality, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 31, 2004, at 10.
306. In 2005, only seventeen percent of partners at major law firms nationwide were
female. Timothy L. O’Brien, Up the Down Staircase: Why Do So Few Women Reach the
Top of Big Law Firms?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, Sec. 3 at 1. “Even those who have
made it to the top of their profession say that the data shows that women’s legal careers
involve distinct, often insurmountable hurdles and that those hurdles remain misunderstood
or underexamined.” Id.
307. English, supra note 305, at 10.
308. See id. According to one attorney, law firms’ problems are centered on
advancement and retention and those problems are caused by biases, not direct
discrimination. See O’Brien, supra note 306, at 1. Bias is hard to prove. See John
Rossheim, If You Suspect Hiring Bias, http://diversity.monster.com/articles/hiringbias/ (last
visited Oct. 10, 2006).
309. See English, supra note 305, at 10.
310. See id.
311. Id.

REUTER_CHRISTENSEN

140

2/3/2011 10:20 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

woman must conform to the male-centric job model, a model that
accommodates children only if the parent can afford comprehensive
childcare and does not intend to spend much time with her children. In
fact, a recent study showed that women who leave their law firm jobs to
take a more active role in childcare often feel pushed into that choice and
would choose to maintain their careers and their families if the workplace
were structured to accommodate their needs.312
All of the stereotypes surrounding pregnancy and motherhood may help
to explain why motherhood has such a strong negative effect on a woman’s
income. 313 The salary gap for mothers has increased, though the difference
between the salaries of men and women in general has decreased.314 And
some studies show that this pay gap is related to the differences in childcare
responsibilities, not education and experience.315 Interestingly, several
courts have held that childcare is gender-neutral. 316 But this is often not
the perception that employers hold, and “[t]he impact of these perceptions
upon the employment of mothers cannot be addressed when the gender
neutrality of parenthood is the court’s emphasis.” 317 Though the gender
neutrality of childcare might be a worthy goal, it is not a reality, as
reflected in the large wage gap experienced by mothers. 318
To another woman, English wrote, “[I]f you start a job and then
immediately or soon thereafter leave on maternity leave, asking to return
on a part-time basis, partners will resent it. That’s a fact, leaving aside that
they can’t discriminate against you on the basis of pregnancy.” 319 English
appears to be saying that though the partners may not discriminate in a way
that is actionable, the consequence of maternity leave, followed by asking
for a part-time schedule will be a cooling attitude towards the employee.
Thus, by asking for the accommodations needed to be both a mother and a
worker, a woman limits her career choices by alienating her employer. This
is discrimination, but a plaintiff is not likely to be successful in a suit based
on this subtle form. The tide may be changing, however: the EEOC issued
a charge determination for this sort of discrimination in the case of Laurie

312. See O’Brien, supra note 306, at 1.
313. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 313.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See, e.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997); Record
v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. For the Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
317. Magid, supra note 61, at 833.
318. Mothers are more likely than fathers to bear the primary responsibility for childcare.
See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 312. Women perform approximately eighty percent of the
childcare for their families. See id. at 313.
319. English, supra note 305, at 10.
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Anne Freeman, mentioned in the Introduction to this Comment.
As seen in Freeman’s case, when women become pregnant, become
mothers, or ask for a reduced or more flexible schedule, certain stereotypes
are triggered. 320 “Studies indicate that once one of these three events
occurs, a woman is more likely to be viewed as a ‘low-competence
caregiver rather than as a high-competence business woman.’” 321 Covering
is one tactic used by women to try to avoid the negative stereotypes
associated with pregnancy and motherhood.
a. Covering
The current statutory scheme encourages women to cover, subsuming
their true identities and perpetuating the male-centric job model. Covering
is attempting to make an undesirable characteristic less obtrusive.322
Homosexuality, disability, age, and motherhood are examples of stigmas
that people attempt to cover. Yale Law Professor Kenji Yoshino’s notion
of covering describes “a subtler form of discrimination.”
This discrimination does not aim at groups as a whole. Rather it aims at
the subset of the group that refuses to cover, that is, to assimilate to
dominant norms. And for the most part, existing civil rights laws do not
protect individuals against such covering demands. The question of our
time is whether we should understand this new discrimination to be a
harm and, if so, whether the remedy is legal or social in nature. 323

Because this type of discrimination does not affect broad, easily identified
groups, it is more difficult to see and to regulate.
Discrimination against pregnant women, mothers, and caregivers is
exactly the type of subtle discrimination anticipated by Yoshino. Working
mothers do not fit into the current workplace’s male-centric job model,
which is based on an outdated version of the nuclear family. 324 The
workplace today remains structured around the “ideal worker”—an
employee with no childcare responsibilities who is able to work forty plus
hours per week year round and work overtime on little or no notice.325
“Employers generally accept the importance of ‘face time,’ regardless

320. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 314.
321. Id. (citations omitted).
322. Covering was first termed by Erving Goffman in his book STIGMA, written in 1963.
See Yoshino, supra note 144, at 32. The term was then adopted by Kenji Yoshino, a Yale
law professor, in his recent book, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS.
See id.
323. Id.
324. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 310.
325. Id.
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whether it correlates to higher quality work. The privileges that nonmothers enjoy in the workplace are simply taken for granted.” 326 Thus, in
order to succeed and fit within the male-centric job model, women are
forced to cover—subsuming their pregnancies and their roles as mothers
and caregivers in order to appear more like the “ideal worker.”
Enforcement of Title VII and the PDA has not stopped women from
feeling the need to cover. In fact, the PDA has only served to enforce that
need. According to the Seventh Circuit in Maldonado, a woman can be
discriminated against because of the side effects of her pregnancy though
not simply for the fact that she is pregnant. 327 Magid argued that the
court’s holding in Maldonado encourages women to hide their pregnancies
from their employers for fear that one small inconvenience to an employer
could cost her job. 328 And discrimination, which occurs after a woman
gives birth, perhaps due to breast-feeding or childcare, is generally not
covered by the PDA. 329 Thus in order to avoid these unactionable forms of
discrimination, women must cover—they must make sure that they present
themselves as workers first and women second.
Clay v. Holy Cross Hospital is an example of how covering can hurt
women when they decide to sue for pregnancy discrimination. In Clay, the
plaintiff initially concealed her pregnancy from her employer. 330 Then,
when she sued under the PDA, a major issue was whether or not the
employer knew of her pregnancy at the time it selected her for the
reduction-in-force. Had the plaintiff not tried to “keep things quiet,” 331 she
would not have faced this hurdle in her case. During her deposition,
however, when the plaintiff was asked why she did not send in her
maternity leave request earlier, the plaintiff said, “[B]ecause I was trying to
keep things quiet. I didn’t want those who were not friends of mine to be
aware of the fact that I was pregnant, so that’s why I waited.”332 The
plaintiff hid her pregnancy from her employer in order to avoid
discrimination, but by doing so she hurt her chances of winning in a suit
when the discrimination (arguably) did occur.
And if the PDA is even further stripped of its meaning by evernarrowing decisions, employers will realize the limited bite of the PDA and
accordingly allow the stereotypes and biases the Act was designed to

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 314.
See Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 1999).
See Magid, supra note 61, at 831.
See supra notes 100-131, 176-211 and accompanying text.
See Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1007 n.6.

REUTER_CHRISTENSEN

20xx]

2/3/2011 10:20 PM

DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE

143

eliminate infiltrate the employment decision making process. 333 The
situation could worsen, forcing more and more women to cover and
effectively causing an effect opposite to the one the PDA was intended to
create.
3. Proposals for Change
Several of the scholars discussed in this Comment offer proposals to
make it easier for pregnant women to have children and careers without
facing discrimination and ultimately to make women and men equal in the
workplace and at home. Julie Manning Magid’s proposal does not involve
a new statute or even an amendment to an existing statute. Instead, Magid
argues for a broader reading of the PDA; one that does not use artificially
high evidentiary standards or read the two clauses of the PDA together.334
The crux of Magid’s argument is that the stereotypes and biases the PDA
was intended to eliminate inform the evidentiary standards used in PDA
cases. 335 Magid believes that by examining the standards as they are now
and adjusting them, the PDA can achieve its intended goals. 336 A change
in evidentiary standards would afford pregnant women and mothers
considerably more protection from discrimination, but such a change would
be difficult to effectuate. It would involve changing the habits and attitudes
of judges and, in some circuits, ignoring precedent, and thus it may be
wishful thinking.
Debbie N. Kaminer’s article focused on the work-family conflict and
proposed a parental accommodation model based on section 701(j) of Title
VII, which mandates religious accommodation in the workplace.337
Kaminer is attracted to section 701(j) because it balances the needs of
employer and employee and only requires accommodation when the
employer will not suffer undue hardship. 338 “This balancing approach will
provide increased flexibility for working parents, while ensuring that any
cost to employers is not overly burdensome.” 339 One concern of the
accommodation approach set forth by Kaminer is that it sends the message
that mothers are asking for special treatment. 340 Kaminer’s reply to this
concern is that formal equality has failed to protect working parents and

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
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See Magid, supra note 61, at 833.
Id. at 855-56.
See id. at 835.
See id.
See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 308.
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Id. at 364.
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something else needs to be done to give additional protection.341 Kaminer
does not address the feasibility of her plan other than to say that it would be
cost-effective in the long term. 342 Work-family conflicts warranting
accommodations are likely more prevalent than religious concerns
warranting accommodation. Thus, it might be interesting to know what
effect the larger number of accommodations required to deal with workfamily conflicts would have on the workings of the statute. Whether or not
the logistics of this proposal are practical, it presents an interesting new
way to look at the accommodation of working parents.
Kathryn Branch’s proposal begins with the idea that men and women are
different. 343 She expresses concern that a woman who desires to succeed
in the workplace should not have to emulate a man. 344 A woman should
not have to cover in order to succeed—she should be able to be feminine
and successful. 345 The goals of Branch’s proposal are (1) to establish
institutional and structural support for families so that simultaneous
dedication to family and career are both feasible and permissible; (2) the
rejection of prescriptive sex roles and expectations; and (3) an increase in
the value American culture gives to nurturing work such as childcare.346
Branch suggests a variety of ends to this goal and does not theorize one
coherent piece of legislation. 347 She argues that the primary component of
an effective solution is “a shift in the norms and ideals of American
society.” 348 To accomplish this she suggests changing the assumptions on
which existing legislation is based and legislating on issues addressed to
Proactive legislation would include governmentsex inequities. 349
mandated provisions for non-gender-based childcare and non-genderBranch suggests government-sponsored
specific parental leaves. 350
programs to help parents devote more time to childcare, such as an
extension of the school day, and the “re-allocation of work and family time
over the life cycle” by subsidizing parents with low interest loans so that
they can spend more time with their children when their children are
young, and work full-time when their children are grown. 351 Branch’s
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
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legislative solution attempts to achieve the ambitious goal of changing the
norms and gender biases underlying American culture.
During a symposium on work-family conflict in 1999, Joan C. Williams,
concerned with many of the same issues as Branch, espoused a “principle
of proportional work.” 352 By that Williams meant that part-time workers
should get paid in proportion to the amount of work they do, get
proportional benefits, and receive proportional advancement. 353 Williams
acknowledged that there is a stigma attached to flexible policies, and so
while many employers already have such policies, few people use them.354
“So long as these flexible policies are linked with marginalization, in my
view, they’re merely another way of discrimination.” 355 Williams argued
that the reason gender has proven to be so unbending is the clash between
the male-centric job model and the norm of parental care.356 A policy of
proportional work would change the male-centric job model by decreasing
the importance of face-time and ensuring equal pay for equal work, and
help both men and women. 357 Williams’s policy proposal is more discrete
and thus more workable than Branch’s, but it would still be very difficult to
implement.
An approach that would be fairly simple to implement is Shana M.
Christrup’s proposal. Christrup’s article focused on breast-feeding.
Logically, her solution, a breast-pumping accommodation policy, is
focused solely on the lack of coverage currently afforded to breast-feeding
in this country. Christup, however, asserted that a breast-pumping
accommodation policy would help women and mothers achieve workplace
equality by permitting women to enter the sphere of continuous
employment and men to enter the sphere of childcare.358 Although a
breast-milk pumping policy does not preserve the important mother-child
bond formed by breast-feeding, many of the health advantages to women
and children are retained. Also, men are able to take a larger role in
childcare because they too can engage in the bonding activity of feeding
the baby. Breast-pumping policies promote equality by enabling women to
return to work quickly after the birth of a child and giving men more of a

352. Joan C. Williams, Symposium Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict
and What to Do About It, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 851, 856 (2000) [hereinafter Williams,
Symposium].
353. See id.
354. See id. at 856-57.
355. Id. at 857.
356. See id.
357. See id. at 858.
358. See Christrup, supra note 54, at 497.
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role in childrearing. 359 Breast-pumping is also a more cost-effective
solution for employers than having women stay home to breast-feed their
children. 360 Christrup’s proposal is relatively easy to implement and could
have wide-reaching social and economic results.
Another approach is the Draft of a Bill to Protect Against Discrimination
on the Basis of Familial Caregiver Status (“Family-Friendly Workplace
Act”) proposed by the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York. 361
The basic premise of the statute is to add family caregiver status to the list
of protected classes in state and local statutes.362 Family caregiver is
defined broadly in the statute. 363 The statute would apply to disparate
impact and disparate treatment claims. 364 The statute would address all
employers with fifteen or more employers, 365 and is designed so that it
could be added to any existing state or local anti-discrimination statute.366
This anti-discrimination legislation proposal is workable, practical, and
directed at alleviating the subtle discrimination faced by working parents.
In some ways it would do on a local level for caregivers what the PDA did
on a national level for pregnant women.
These proposals are all different, but they all have similar goals: not just
to halt discrimination but to change the social norms, biases, and embedded
assumptions about women that result in discrimination. In Part III, I will
outline my proposal for change.
III. THE PARENTAL DISCRIMINATION ACT
The current statutory scheme is insufficient to protect pregnant women
and mothers from discrimination in the workplace. Because of the statutes
themselves and the narrow way they have been interpreted by many courts,
the current statutory scheme does not have the power to stop the subtle
forms of discrimination common in the workplace today. And women
cannot truly be free to make autonomous decisions about work and family
until the male-centric job model is revised and the stereotypes of women
fade. Legal thinkers and organizations promoting work and family argue

359. See id.
360. See id. at 499-501.
361. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc., Draft of a Bill to Protect against
Discrimination on the Basis of Familial Caregiver Status, available at
www.antibiaslaw.com/familyfriendly.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2006).
362. See id.
363. See id. § 2(a)-(c).
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See id.
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for a broader reading of the existing statutes. For example, Magid argues
that the PDA has a role in protecting women from having to choose
between a job and a family and that its role can be realized “through a
continual reexamination of the protections afforded by the Act and how
those protections can be accomplished in a changing work
environment.” 367 Magid’s proscription involves a broader definition of
direct evidence and asks courts to apply a version of the PDA more in line
with Congress’s intent. 368 The National Partnership for Work and Families
argues modestly that
[t]he growth in both pregnancy discrimination claims and claims by men
and women who face discrimination because of their family care
responsibilities demonstrates a continuing need for vigorous enforcement
of Title VII, and public education for employees and employers about
how the law works. Further, the EEOC should explore how Title VII can
be used to challenge discriminatory employment practices related to an
individual’s family responsibilities that may not be covered by the
PDA. 369

These ideas for reform would be positive steps, but they are hard to
effectuate and would not have the reach that a new statute would. Also,
they would not attack the embedded assumptions and underlying biases and
stereotypes that result in discrimination and, therefore, would not do
enough to establish equality between men and women in the workplace and
the home. I suggest that the law needs to go even further—the existing
statutes are not enough.
Branch, Christrup, Williams, and the Anti-Discrimination Center of
Metro New York all argue for new legislation, but their proposals are very
different. Christrup’s breast-pumping accommodation proposal focuses on
one aspect of the problem—lack of accommodation for breast-feeding
mothers—and devises a solution that would be relatively easy to
implement. 370 Christrup’s practical plan may also effectuate a larger
change by permitting women to return to work earlier while still providing
a valuable resource to their children. If women had more involvement in
the workforce generally, some of employers’ fears and stereotypes about
female employees may be dissipated.
Branch does not argue for one specific legislative solution; instead she
puts forth a variety of possible legislative actions that would work together

367.
368.
369.
370.

Magid, supra note 61, at 855.
See id. at 856.
WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 13.
See Christrup, supra note 54, at 494-97.
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to create change.371 Branch is focused on giving families support so that
work and family can coexist, abandoning the traditional sex roles, and
increasing the value given to nurturing work, such as childcare. Rather
than putting forth a specific plan, Branch mentions many possible ideas
that would further her three goals.
Williams’s proposal, of pay and benefits proportional to the amount of
work done by a person, is specific and targeted at improving the situation
for women in the workplace and changing the attitudes about gender that
result in discrimination.372 It could go a long way towards changing the
male-centric job model by changing the way employers think about facetime. 373 Making face-time less important to employers would put women
(and men) with childcare responsibilities at less of a disadvantage in the
workplace.
The Family-Friendly Workplace Act would give caregivers (male or
female) who have been discriminated against at work a cause of action.
The legislation is proposed for implementation on the state and local level,
and it is more likely to be implemented on those levels than it would be on
the national level, particularly because it specifically includes so many
employers. It might not solve the problems identified in this Comment
about evidentiary standards, because courts may still institute heightened
evidentiary standards. It appears that courts may read the legislation to
protect only those employees discriminated against purely based on their
status as a caregiver, rather than because of the realities that come with
being a caregiver. Nevertheless, this proposal takes meaningful and
realistic steps toward making men and women truly equal at home and in
the workplace, by protecting them equally from this type of discrimination.
An anti-discrimination statute without an accommodation component may
not do enough to change the biases and embedded assumptions that
underlie discrimination against working mothers, however. There is merit
to each of these proposals, and I am convinced by them that a legislative
solution is needed to cure the many problems lurking beneath persistent, if
subtle, discrimination.
Because the existing legislation is not enough, I propose a new piece of
legislation—The Parental Discrimination Act.
The Parental Discrimination Act
1. It shall be illegal for an employer to discriminate against an employee
who is a pregnant woman, mother, or father on the basis of the

371. See Branch, supra note 236, at 155-66.
372. See Williams Symposium, supra note 352, at 856.
373. See id.
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employee’s status as a pregnant woman, mother, or father. An employer
may defend on the grounds that sex or pregnancy status is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the regular operation
of that business.
2. It shall be illegal for an employer to discriminate against a female
employee on the basis of illness or changing biological requirements due
to pregnancy or time needed to give birth, recover from giving birth,
breast-feed, or pump breast milk. An employer may not discriminate
against a female employee who needs reasonable accommodations (e.g.
breaks during the day to pump breast milk in a private room) to
accommodate breast-feeding or breast pumping.
3. It shall be illegal for an employer to discriminate against parents on the
basis of their status as parents or because they need reasonable
accommodations in order to accommodate a job and a family.
Reasonable accommodations include, but are not limited to, the use of
sick days to take care of children, infrequent breaks from work to pick up
a sick or otherwise needy child or to take a child to the doctor, minor
adjustments in work schedule to accommodate childcare, and occasional
phone calls at work to deal with childcare issues.
4. In order to prove discrimination under this Act, a plaintiff need not
show that he or she was treated differently than similarly situated
employees of the opposite sex. This standard is unreasonable, when only
women can give birth and lactate. For example, a lactating woman who
files a discrimination suit under this Act need only show that she was
treated unfairly when compared to how non-lactating employees were
treated.

The purpose of this legislation on a “micro” level is to make it easier for
women to participate in the work sphere and for men to participate in the
home sphere. But the larger purpose of this statute is ultimately to change
attitudes about gender in the workplace. Men should be free from the
stigma attached to taking family leave or staying home with their children.
Women should not feel that their jobs are in jeopardy if they choose to
become pregnant and take leave granted to them by the FMLA or an
employer’s family-friendly policy. Like Branch’s proposal, the Parental
Discrimination Act sweeps broadly, but its four points are targeted at
patching the holes in coverage identified throughout this Comment. This
proposal is not an accommodation policy, nor is it narrowly focused on
formal equality.
Section 1 of the proposed Parental Discrimination Act clarifies the
protections already theoretically granted by Title VII and the PDA. Section
2 broadens those protections to include the logical realities related to
pregnancy and childbirth.
Section 3 prevents employers from

REUTER_CHRISTENSEN

150

2/3/2011 10:20 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

discriminating against parents who need reasonable grants of flexibility to
accommodate their childcare responsibilities while maintaining their
careers. Section 3 also takes aim at the male-centric job model and
employees’ need to cover by encouraging acceptance of employees’
outside roles into the conception of the worker. Section 4 takes aim at the
heightened evidentiary standards required by some courts and complained
of in Magid’s article, on the premise that more Title VII and PDA plaintiffs
would be successful if the standards required of them were attainable.
Through this forward-thinking legislation, women’s differences are
accounted for and an attempt is made to give men access to the home
sphere as women are given increased access to the work sphere on their
own terms. Further, the Parental Discrimination Act may benefit
employers by encouraging women to remain in the workforce continuously
and by creating happier and therefore more productive employees, while at
the same time providing immeasurable benefits to parents and children.
The number of employers affected by the proposal, however, would
determine the scope of its effect. If the Parental Discrimination Act were
applied to all employers, the change would be dramatic; but even if it were
only applied to a subset of employers and employees (like the FMLA), it
would create a significant positive change.
CONCLUSION
New legislation is needed to grapple with the more subtle forms of
discrimination against pregnant women and mothers still prevalent in the
workplace today. But that legislation must not only deal with the surface
problem—discrimination—it must also delve under the surface to tackle
the underlying biases, embedded assumptions, and stereotypes that inform
such discrimination. Though my proposal is unlikely to be implemented
given the current political regime, it would make great strides toward the
goals of changing the way society thinks about gender and parenting.

